How China, Russia and Iran fueled U.S. post-election unrest | Parami News

With just over two weeks to go before the U.S. presidential election on November 5, Vice President Kamala Harris and former president Donald Trump It continues to be a close race. Various polls predict the race will be tight and could ultimately be decided by thousands of voters in so-called swing states.
neck and neck between harris and harris trump card Increased potential for foreign actors to interfere in U.S. presidential elections.

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Declassified National Intelligence Council report warns foreign adversaries including China, Russia and U.S. Iranmay exploit U.S. post-election vulnerabilities to fuel post-election unrest in 2024 and deepen political divisions.
The seven-page memo also said Tehran’s campaign to assassinate former President Donald Trump and other former U.S. officials could continue beyond Election Day regardless of the outcome.
These countries have a history of interfering in U.S. elections through disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks and indirect support for protests. This time, they can step up their game and exploit existing tensions to destabilize the electoral aftermath.

why this is important

Although U.S. elections are highly secure, the period after Election Day—especially during vote counting, certification, and the peaceful transfer of power—remains vulnerable to foreign influence.
By amplifying protests or spreading disinformation, these adversaries could disrupt or delay the democratic process. This threat is particularly worrisome given the heated political environment and the potential for foreign powers to exploit any unrest for geopolitical gain.

overall view

The report highlights that these foreign actors are well-positioned to take advantage of the politically charged atmosphere in the United States. They can use cyberattacks, information manipulation, and even indirectly encourage protests to undermine confidence in the election results and disrupt critical post-election processes.
Cyber ​​threats: The report states that Russia, China and Iran all possess the technical capabilities to conduct cyber attacks on U.S. election infrastructure. However, the intelligence community assesses that they are unlikely to change the vote count because doing so would almost certainly lead to detection and carry a high risk of retaliation. Instead, these countries could focus on more subtle methods, such as spreading disinformation about vote counts and unofficial reporting, which could lead to confusion or doubt about the integrity of the election.
Example: The pro-Russian group Killnet 2.0 announced its intention to interfere in the 2024 U.S. election, but did not specify how it would do so before deleting the post.
Disinformation campaigns: Disinformation remains an important tool for these actors. The report notes that foreign adversaries may amplify doubts or false narratives about the electoral process while results are not finalized. By sowing distrust in institutions or exploiting protests, they can exploit divisions and create an environment of uncertainty and fear.
In January, Russia’s GRU tried to recruit an unsuspecting American to organize protests. Iran has also been active in encouraging Americans to participate in protests, such as the pro-Palestinian demonstrations in Washington, D.C., earlier this year.

Read between the lines

Foreign adversaries are not necessarily creating unrest from scratch—they are exacerbating existing divisions within the United States. The report highlights that countries such as Russia, China and Iran are more likely to incite spontaneous protests rather than initiate them directly.
Iran’s strategy: Iran can use the Internet to influence operations, including leaking sensitive information (doxing) and even inciting violence. In 2020, Iranian cyber actors, possibly affiliated with the IRGC, created a website to issue death threats against U.S. election officials and publish personally identifiable information to incite further unrest.
Focus on Russia: Russia is likely to repeat its previous election practice of using social media activity to amplify disinformation, particularly regarding vote counting, certification and elections. electoral college process. Moscow’s long-term goal is to undermine U.S. democratic institutions and political stability by fomenting discord.
China’s subtle approach: China’s approach is more cautious but may use existing protests or misinformation to subtly push narratives that question the legitimacy of U.S. democratic institutions. Although less overt than those of Russia and Iran, China’s influence activities could still lead to instability in the political landscape.

Zoom in: Post-election vulnerability

The intelligence report highlighted that foreign actors may have discovered some vulnerabilities after the election. These stages, from vote counting to certification of results, are critical and could be disrupted if protests or disinformation campaigns gain traction.
Counting and reporting: Foreign actors may exploit delays between voting and final results to spread disinformation and cast doubt on the accuracy of vote counts. While the official vote count is secure, the period before the results are certified could be a prime target for foreign influence.
Protests and Violence: The report highlights the risk that foreign adversaries could encourage or amplify protests, particularly those that turn violent. In some states, election certification requires in-person meetings, making the process vulnerable if large protests or threats prevent officials from entering necessary venues.
For example: If protests persist beyond Election Day, foreign actors could use these disruptions to impede the certification process or the Electoral College meeting. This is particularly worrisome in states with strict legal frameworks that do not allow for virtual certification, increasing the risk of program collapse.

what are they talking about

“Foreign-driven or amplified violent protests, violence, or physical threats against election staff or state and local officials could challenge the ability of state and local officials to carry out certification and elements of the Electoral College process,” the report warns. This could extend beyond the election. As a result, the inauguration process may also be disrupted.
The report also highlights that threats may not end with the election but could continue into Inauguration Day, especially if protests and physical threats continue. In this context, foreign adversaries may take every opportunity to further discredit the U.S. political system and widen domestic divisions.

what’s next

To counter these threats, the report recommends a multi-pronged approach that includes direct warnings to adversaries, public messaging to “debunk” or debunk false narratives, and proactive communications between local officials and law enforcement. While it may be difficult to completely prevent adversaries from engaging in post-election interference, increasing public awareness and resilience to disinformation can mitigate some of the impact.
The United States is now better prepared than in previous election cycles, with stronger defenses in place against cyberattacks and foreign disinformation campaigns. However, the political landscape remains fragile and foreign adversaries may continue to test the limits of U.S. defenses.
(Based on input from each agency)