NEW DELHI: A public inquiry into the 2017 Grenfell Tower fire in London, which claimed 72 lives, has primarily blamed the disaster on failings by government, the construction industry, and companies involved in fitting the flammable cladding.
The Grenfell Tower blaze, which occurred on June 14, 2017, in a 23-storey social housing block in one of London’s wealthiest areas, stands as the deadliest fire in a residential building in Britain since World War Two.
In its final 1,700-page report, the inquiry laid most of the responsibility on the companies involved in the building’s maintenance and refurbishment and criticised local and national authorities, along with regulatory groups and specific firms, for dishonestly marketing combustible cladding as safe.
“The fire at Grenfell Tower was the culmination of decades of failure by central government and other bodies in positions of responsibility in the construction industry,” stated the inquiry report.
Survivors and the families of those who died have long demanded justice and criminal charges for those responsible. British police have indicated that 58 people and 19 firms and organisations are under investigation.
What did the inquiry’s earlier report state?
An earlier report from the inquiry in 2019 revealed that the fire originated from an electrical fault in a refrigerator in a fourth-floor apartment. The flames spread uncontrollably due to the tower’s exterior cladding, which had been added during a 2016 refurbishment.
This cladding consisted of flammable aluminum composite material that further fueled the fire.
The horrific accounts of those who died while waiting for rescuers, having followed official guidance to stay put, spurred national outrage and reflection on building standards and the treatment of low-income communities.
Retired judge Martin Moore-Bick, who led the inquiry, identified numerous failings, including the inadequacy of safety lessons from previous high-rise fires and insufficient testing systems. The most criticism was directed toward those responsible for the tower’s refurbishment with the flammable cladding. Studio E, the architect, principal contractor Rydon, and cladding sub-contractor Harley were singled out for considerable responsibility for the disaster.
Fire safety inspectors Exova were also criticized for leaving the building in a ‘dangerous condition on completion of the refurbishment.’
Additionally, the Kensington and Chelsea council and the Tenant Management Organisation (TMO), which managed local authority housing, faced heavy criticism. They were accused of showing indifference to fire safety regulations in the years leading up to the blaze. The TMO’s focus on cost-cutting and its strained relationship with residents created a “toxic atmosphere.”
While local community and voluntary groups were praised for their support during the tragedy, the council was criticized for its slow and inadequate response.
The firms involved in producing and selling the cladding and its foam insulation also faced condemnation. The companies named—Celotex, Kingspan, and Arconic Architectural Products (a French subsidiary of U.S company Arconic)—were accused of systemic dishonesty.
“They engaged in deliberate and sustained strategies to manipulate the testing processes, misrepresent tested data and mislead the market,” the inquiry report concluded.
The issue of combustible cladding has raised alarms across Europe, with similar fires occurring in apartment blocks in cities like Valencia, Spain, in February, and in Italy in 2021.
As of July, official data for Britain showed that 3,280 buildings taller than 11 meters still had unsafe cladding, with remediation work yet to commence on more than two-thirds of these structures.
The Grenfell Tower blaze, which occurred on June 14, 2017, in a 23-storey social housing block in one of London’s wealthiest areas, stands as the deadliest fire in a residential building in Britain since World War Two.
In its final 1,700-page report, the inquiry laid most of the responsibility on the companies involved in the building’s maintenance and refurbishment and criticised local and national authorities, along with regulatory groups and specific firms, for dishonestly marketing combustible cladding as safe.
“The fire at Grenfell Tower was the culmination of decades of failure by central government and other bodies in positions of responsibility in the construction industry,” stated the inquiry report.
Survivors and the families of those who died have long demanded justice and criminal charges for those responsible. British police have indicated that 58 people and 19 firms and organisations are under investigation.
What did the inquiry’s earlier report state?
An earlier report from the inquiry in 2019 revealed that the fire originated from an electrical fault in a refrigerator in a fourth-floor apartment. The flames spread uncontrollably due to the tower’s exterior cladding, which had been added during a 2016 refurbishment.
This cladding consisted of flammable aluminum composite material that further fueled the fire.
The horrific accounts of those who died while waiting for rescuers, having followed official guidance to stay put, spurred national outrage and reflection on building standards and the treatment of low-income communities.
Retired judge Martin Moore-Bick, who led the inquiry, identified numerous failings, including the inadequacy of safety lessons from previous high-rise fires and insufficient testing systems. The most criticism was directed toward those responsible for the tower’s refurbishment with the flammable cladding. Studio E, the architect, principal contractor Rydon, and cladding sub-contractor Harley were singled out for considerable responsibility for the disaster.
Fire safety inspectors Exova were also criticized for leaving the building in a ‘dangerous condition on completion of the refurbishment.’
Additionally, the Kensington and Chelsea council and the Tenant Management Organisation (TMO), which managed local authority housing, faced heavy criticism. They were accused of showing indifference to fire safety regulations in the years leading up to the blaze. The TMO’s focus on cost-cutting and its strained relationship with residents created a “toxic atmosphere.”
While local community and voluntary groups were praised for their support during the tragedy, the council was criticized for its slow and inadequate response.
The firms involved in producing and selling the cladding and its foam insulation also faced condemnation. The companies named—Celotex, Kingspan, and Arconic Architectural Products (a French subsidiary of U.S company Arconic)—were accused of systemic dishonesty.
“They engaged in deliberate and sustained strategies to manipulate the testing processes, misrepresent tested data and mislead the market,” the inquiry report concluded.
The issue of combustible cladding has raised alarms across Europe, with similar fires occurring in apartment blocks in cities like Valencia, Spain, in February, and in Italy in 2021.
As of July, official data for Britain showed that 3,280 buildings taller than 11 meters still had unsafe cladding, with remediation work yet to commence on more than two-thirds of these structures.
